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THE DESIGN AND INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS: WHY COMPLEXITY MATTERS
Karen Eggleston,' Eric A. Posner and Richard Zeckhauser3
Recent work in the law and economics of contracts suggests that con-
tracts ought to be highly complex and "fine-tuned." They should have
many terms describing the obligations of parties across alternative future
states of the world; these terms should provide for highly variable rewards
for desired behavior and penalties for undesired behavior, and these rewards
and penalties should bear a complex mathematical relationship to the value
of the benefits produced by the different kinds of behavior. In practice,
however, many contracts are quite simple. They divide the future into very
crude partitions; they provide for constant or close to constant payments
across different outcomes; and the terms are easy to understand. This di-
vergence between theory and practice suggests that the assumptions under-
lying the economic models of contracts should be revised, and it raises
basic questions of public policy of interest to lawyers. What are the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of complexity in contracts? How should courts
think about the complexity of contracts? Should courts enforce complex
contracts more strictly than they enforce simple contracts?
To understand why these questions are important, one might compare
the idea of contractual complexity with the better developed idea of con-
tractual completeness. Courts and contracts scholars now understand that a
contract might be more or less "complete," in the sense of describing the
obligations of parties in different future states of the world. A more com-
plete contract takes account of many future contingencies that would
change the value of performance-increases in the cost of inputs, decline in
demand for the product, and so on. A less complete contract might simply
state the price and performance-deliver the widget on January 1, for SX-
without saying what happens if the product is destroyed in transit or similar
I Assistant Professor of Economics, Tufts University.
2 Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
3 Frank Plumpton Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, Kennedy School of Govemm:nt, Harvard
University. Thanks to Ian Ayres, Lucian Bebchuk, Virginia Coleman, Richard Craswcll, Oliver Hart,
Christine Jolls, Louis Kaplow, Richard Posner, Eric Rasmusen, Thomas Schelling, Alan Sch%,artz. Cass
Sunstein, and George Triantis, and members of audiences at the University of Chicago Law School, Tufts
University, and Harvard Law School, for valuable comments. Posner thanks The Sarah Scaife Founda-
tion Fund and The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for generous financial support.
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events occur. Courts seem to be more willing to aggressively interpret in-
complete contracts than complete contracts. Thus, completeness matters.
The question is whether contractual complexity matters as well.
We argue that it does, and that the current tendency of scholars to fo-
cus on completeness and neglect complexity has resulted in an inadequate
understanding of contracts and contract law.
One of our major themes is that complexity is predicted by models that
make unrealistic assumptions about human behavior and the environment.
The basic point of these models is that contracts should be complex because
of pervasive uncertainty about the future. Because any of an indefinitely
large set of events could influence the cost or value of the performance, a
desirable contract would condition performance on all of these events. As
is well understood, one reason that parties would not draft such a contract is
that the drafting would be extremely costly. But there are many other rea-
sons why parties may avoid complexity when drafting contracts, including:
asymmetric information, monitoring dynamics, evolutionary pressures, con-
ventions, reliance on trust and reputation, enforcement costs, bounded ration-
ality, and renegotiation.4 To take one example, when a firm cares about its
reputation, and its customers know this, they may enter into a simple contract
that does not describe the firm's obligations in detail, because both sides ex-
pect the firm to act in the customer's interests when it is time to perform. Our
positive arguments about contractual complexity are in principle susceptible
to empirical testing and should be of interest to lawyers who draft contracts
and are concerned about the appropriate level of detail.
Our other major theme is that the complexity of a contract is a relevant
consideration for courts when they decide how to interpret a contract. We
do not argue that simple contracts are good and complex contracts are bad,
or vice versa; nor do we argue that courts should always interpret simple
contracts and complex contracts differently. Our argument is more modest
and subtle. It is that the relative complexity of a contract can tell a court
something about the contractual goals of the parties, the process of negotia-
tion, and the environment that the parties faced when they negotiated the
contract. Under certain conditions, the degree of complexity reveals
whether one party took advantage of the other party, whether negotiations
were hampered by asymmetric information, whether the parties anticipated
that trust or reputational concerns would resolve disputes, or whether other
factors influenced the contract. Because courts care about preventing advan-
tage-taking, overcoming problems of asymmetric information, encouraging
trust, and so on, they should take account of the complexity of the contract
when deciding how to interpret the contract and whether to enforce it.
A word about the methodological background of this article. There are
two economic literatures on contracting. One is "law and economics;" the
4 Some of these same factors (e.g., asymmetric information) can push toward complexity in some
circumstances as well. See infra Part 11.
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other is the "economics of contracts."5 Both focus on people's incentives to
enter, invest in, breach, and renegotiate contracts, or broadly to engage in
"contract-related behavior." The two literatures share an underlying pur-
pose: to describe the conditions under which the value of contractual ex-
change is maximized. However, the law and economics literature focuses
on the effects of legal rules, whereas the economics of contracts literature
takes legal rules as given and examines the optimal design of contracts.
Law and economics has a public orientation; it gives advice to courts and
legislatures about the design of legal rules. Economics of contracts has a
private orientation; it gives advice to parties entering exchange relationships
about how to design their contracts.
As some authors have pointed out, the distinction between these lit-
eratures is artificial; a rapprochement is needed.6 Although the two litera-
tures have different focuses, their origins and methods are quite similar, and
their divergence has created two problems. First, the economics of con-
tracts literature has made a number of methodological advances that have
not yet spread to the law and economics literature. Unfortunately, these ad-
vances are often quite technical, and this has hampered the transport across
disciplinary boundaries. Second, there is no reason why law and economics
should ignore problems of contract design,7 and why economics of con-
tracts should ignore problems of legal design. Indeed, the two subjects
cannot be separated; lawyers, judges, and legislatures cannot evaluate con-
tract rules without understanding the contracts that these rules are supposed
to regulate." Yet the law review literature on contracts is almost completely
devoid of the positive analysis of contracts.
This article uses insights from the economics of contracts literature to
discuss both legal rules and contract design. The ideas of contractual sim-
plicity and complexity are used to organize the discussion. The degree of
complexity of a contract is one of its central features, and it is a source of
concern to those who design contracts. The positive regularity that we seek
to explain is the apparent use of highly simple contracts despite the com-
plexity of the environments in which people use contracts. This is the sub-
5 The law and economies literature is produced mainly by law professors, including some econo-
mists who teach at law schools, and appears mainly in law reviews. The economics of contracts litera-
ture is produced mainly by economists who teach in economics departments, and appears mainly in
economicsjournals. Citations to both literatures can be found below.
6 See, eg., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficienc
, 
and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE W. 729,730-31 (1992).
7 See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L Rav. 1745 (1996).
8 Observers sometimes wonder whether courts strike down contracts with apparently one-sided terms
because they do not understand the purpose of these terms. In such cases as Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481
(1834) (involving an employment contract that delayed pay until the end of term) and Williams v Walker-
Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (involving a consumer credit contract with a cross-
collateral clause), the courts might not have understood the economic purposes behind the terms that they
criticized.
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ject of Parts I and II, which together discuss examples and terminology, and
Part I, which explores reasons for contractual simplicity.
We also make several normative arguments in Part IV. There is a tra-
ditional law and economics approach to contract interpretation, which holds
that courts should fill gaps in contracts by either supplying terms that
maximize the value of the contract (the terms that the parties themselves
would have chosen if transaction costs were zero) or providing correct in-
centives for parties to reveal information to each other. There are also more
recent attempts, relying on the economics of contracts literature, to defend
more formal or literal interpretation of contracts. Our focus on complexity
reveals defects in both approaches. We argue that the proper interpretative
strategy depends on the cause of the gap in the contract, and that the com-
plexity or simplicity of the contract provides clues about what that cause is
in any given case.
I. SOME EXAMPLES
Discussions of contractual complexity, and indeed of any kind of com-
plexity, are fraught with difficulty because people have different intuitions
about what complexity means. Some people think that all contracts are
complex. They note that when parties negotiate even the most straightfor-
ward exchange of dollars and widgets, they face a future of great uncer-
tainty, and an indefinitely large number of events could occur that might
affect the value of the contract. Indeed, one might argue that the entire
common law is an implicit term of every contract, but a contract that im-
plicitly incorporates the entire common law could hardly be anything but
complex! According to this view, all contracts are complex, so complexity
is not an interesting phenomenon.
The "all contracts are equally complex" view is not compelling in light
of the variation in complexity of real-world contracts. We present several
examples in this section to emphasize that this variation requires an expla-
nation. We will also use these examples to show why economists are puz-
zled by the simplicity of contracts.
Architectural services. In the architectural profession, two simple
forms of contracts are common: payment based on hourly rates or payment
based on a percentage of construction costs.9 The virtues of a nonstandard,
slightly more complex contract were made evident to one of us when hiring
an architect, Jim, for a major renovation. Jim offered to work on either of
the two standard bases. The hourly rate contract would be at $60. Alterna-
tively, he offered to do the job for a fixed price contract of $6,000, which
represented a percentage of his estimate of construction costs. The architect
estimated the time required to be 100 hours. The parties agreed that either
9 See BOSTON SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS, OWNER, ARCHITECT, CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS: A
PROJECT GUIDE (1987).
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an hourly contract or a fixed price contract would present perverse incen-
tives-the first to gold plate, the second to skimp. After determining that
Jim's reservation price was roughly $45 per hour, the parties settled on an
arrangement under which Jim would be paid $1,500 plus $45 per hour.
Both parties liked the innovative contract, which paid a fixed price plus im-
plicit marginal cost, as efficiency would require.'0 The contract worked
quite well, particularly when some additional tasks (e.g., putting in a
kitchen fan) arose, as they almost always do. However, Jim says that he has
not since then used any fixed-fee-plus-marginal-charge contract. As he ex-
plains, "it is too complicated and my clients would not understand."" De-
spite their efficiency benefits and use in some fields, contracts that combine
a lump sum and an hourly rate seem to be virtually unknown in the design
and construction field.'
2
Legal services. Lawyers generally charge clients either an hourly rate
or a contingency fee. Yet an hourly rate gives the lawyer an incentive to
spend too much time on a case, while a contingency fee-usually 330/-
may give the lawyer an incentive to take risks that the client does not want
to bear. Mixed contracts, where the lawyer charges, say, $1000 plus S200
per hour to draw up a will, or $200 per hour plus 20% of any award to
represent a plaintiff in litigation, are not unknown, 13 but are much less
common than economic theory would suggest. Contracts gravitate toward
one of two simple extremes, rather than the complex middle .
4
Health care. Health care is another arena where complex contracts
might seem optimal, but simple contracts prevail. Like architecture con-
tracts, health care contracts frequently employ two quite different simple
approaches. Doctors are usually paid either on a fee-for-service basis or a
10 See infra subpart II.B.
11 Interestingly, at the moment Jim is once again under the employ of the same author to remodel
two bathrooms. But on this project he is working on an hourly basis. Implicitly, the parties have recog-
nized the virtue of a simple contract.
12 Bajari & Tadelis cite numerous empirical studies that confirm that simple cost-plus or fixed pnce
contracts are prevalent in the private sector construction industry; mixed or incentive contracts are rare.
Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Con-
tracts (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); see also Business Roundtable, Contractual
Arrangements. CICE Project A-7 (last modified Dec. 1987) <http:/www.brtable.orgpdUl1.pdf%.
13 For example, the FDIC and Cravath, Svain and Moore's fee arrangement in connection with the
Savings and Loan affair provided for payment of $300 per hour plus an amount that was an increasing
function of the damages that Cravath recovered for the FDIC. As a consequence, senior litigators could
earn as much as $600 per hour if they were successful, while their ordinary hourly rate was S375 to
$400. See Stephen Labaton, For F.D.LC "s Top Lmv Finn, Fees Reaching $600 an Hour, N.Y. Tim.is,
April 5, 1991, atAl.
14 Nonunion employment contracts are generally quite simple, often stating only that the employee
"has ajob at a particular (current) vrage." Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom, The Thcory of Contracts,
in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 5TH WORLD CONGRESS 71, 126 (T. Bewley ed., 1937). An em-
pirical study of a single fir's wage policy over 20 years and involving more than 60,000 observations,
found that it was "less sensitive to individual differences than typical incentive theories vould pre-
scribe.' George Baker et al., The Wage Policy of a Firm, 109 QJ. ECON. 921,953 (1994).
95:91 (2000)
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capitation (fixed fee per person) basis. Yet standard models suggest that a
mixed system, such as a flat fee per person plus additional payment for
certain services, would create better incentives.' s This again illustrates that
even though standard contract models suggest that a mixed system, like the
one used with Jim the architect, would be preferable, real world contracts
tend toward simple extremes.
Software. In the Indian software industry, contracts between clients
and software firms are almost exclusively of two simple types, fixed price
contracts or "time and materials" contracts.16 Like the architecture, legal,
and health care contracts, the software contracts belong to one of two sim-
ple types, apparently because parties prefer an extreme but simple contract
to a more complex contract that provides for more appropriate incentives
and sharing of risk.
Debt. Ordinary corporate debt contracts are widely believed to be too
simple. These contracts require the debtor to make fixed payments inde-
pendent of verifiable information such as market conditions. Yet, except
under unusual circumstances, the parties should want to give the debtor the
ability to reduce payments when "bad states of the world" (such as a reces-
sion or other market downturn that can be verified by the creditor and a
court) occur. 7
Movie actors. Movie actor contracts, apart from those for major stars,
are variable along only a few key dimensions, such as salary, guarantee,
billing, and transportation payments. Generally, the casting director draws
up a "deal memorandum" with the actor. The studio then completes a con-
tract. The deal memo is typically a single page, whereas the formal signed
contract may run fifteen or more pages. But these pages are boilerplate and
have little influence on behavior. The basic agreement between the two
parties is simple, whereas detailed contingencies are negotiated either
through specialized agents such as lawyers, or relegated to the control of
standard industry contracts, or both.18
Is See Joseph P. Newhouse, Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production
Versus Selection, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1236 (1996).
16 Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of
the Indian Software Industry, 115 Q.J. ECON. 989 (2000).
17 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optinal
Contracts, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 1.2 & n.2 (1992).
18 Discussion with Gretchen Court, casting director (November 25, 1998) and review of a number
of contracts. The role of lawyers as specialized agents, and its relationship to the complexity of con-
tracts, merits its own analysis. We note only a few important issues. The tendency of lawyers to imitate
prior contracts increases the prevalence of boilerplate terms. Lawyers' professional training and experi-
ence will often make them more sensitive to the need to protect against breach of contract, and less sen-
sitive to the need to signal trustworthiness and assure that the initial deal is signed, than are the principal
contracting parties. Lawyers may view adding many contingencies to the contract as their professional
and ethical responsibility, whereas the cost of such detail is of little concern to them. Indeed, financial
incentives are often to increase complexity to justify more income. In these and in other ways, there will
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Thus, substantial evidence indicates that contracts are simpler than
what one might expect. We stress that we do not claim that they are simple
in some absolute sense; only that they are simpler than what is predicted by
economic theory and perhaps the untutored intuitions of those outside the
business world. Of course, some contracts are genuinely complex, though
fewer than one might expect.
Moreover, simple contracts do not necessarily imply simple behavior.
Contracts that are simple may lead to quite subtle behavior, either because
the contract is revised as time plays out, or because long-term relationships
produce behaviors that are not primarily driven by the incentives in the
contracts. 19
Why do parties shy from complex contracts and embrace simple ones?
To answer this question, we first develop some theoretical distinctions.
II. SOME PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS
A. Complexity
"Complexity" has become a hot topic across academic disciplines as
diverse as biology, computer science, physics, and economics. But these
discussions are hampered by the difficulty of agreeing on what complexity
means. The term is subtle and ambiguous, and much ink has been spilled in
quarrels over its proper definition.20 What is clear is that the proper defmi-
tion of complexity depends on the problem that one wants to solve.
We treat complexity as a multidimensional concept that can only be
judged relative to the contracting environment. Specifically, by "complex-
ity," we refer to the following three dimensions of the contract: (1) the ex-
pected number of payoff-relevant contingencies specified in the contract; (2)
the variance in the magnitude of the payoffs contracted to flow between the
parties; and (3) the cognitive load required to understand the contract. Each
component of complexity is measured along a continuum: contracts are ei-
ther more or less complex.2'
be a divergence between the incentives of the contracting principals and their specialized legal agents, vith
important implications for the complexity of resulting contracts.
19 Baneijee & Duflo find that despite the simplicity of the cx ante formal contracts in the Indian
software industry, as the projects unfold renegotiation results in behavior that is highly contingency-
specific. Banerjee & Duflo, supra note 16. Although the party that initially is assigned all of the cost
overrun risk does end up bearing the majority of that risk, there is substantial cost sharing: "when [firms]
have a fixed price contract [which assigns 100% of cost overrun risk to the firm], they bear on average
66 percent of the overrun ... when they have a time and materials contract, they bear on average 26 per-
cent of it." Id. at 1003. Thus, relatively simple contracts may guide fairly complex transactions as the
contracts are modified and renegotiated over the course of the relationship.
20 See J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics, 13 J. Eco%.
PERSP. 169, 170 (1999).
21 There have been several attempts by legal scholars to analyze the complexity of lins, as opposed
to the complexity of contracts. See Eric Kades, The Lins of Complexity and the Complexi) , of Lais:
95:91 (2000)
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 97 2000-2001
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A contract is complex along the first dimension if it is rich in state
contingencies; that is, it assigns a different payoff for each of a large num-
ber of future states of the world, where those states may include the actions
taken by the parties. For any given future state of the world, the contract
will typically specify both the parties' obligations and their entitlements.
The value of the entitlements net of obligations is a party's payoff. We ex-
clude payoffs that are specified in the contract but are contingent on events
that are not expected to occur. Thus, the relevant criterion of complexity is
the expected number of relevant contingencies. This will be a function of
the total number of contingencies and the likelihoods with which they mate-
rialize. Thus, a contract with three equally likely contingencies is more
complex than one with two equally likely contingencies. And for contracts
A and B, both with two contingencies, B is more complex than A if its con-
tingencies occur with probability of 50%, and A's contingencies occur with
probabilities of 90% and 10%.22
A contract is complex along the second dimension if it results in a high
degree of variability of payments that one party will make under different
contingencies, independent of the number of contingencies. Compare two
employment contracts for a salesperson, which anticipate that the employee
may be able to sell a lot of widgets, or only a few, depending on the em-
ployee's level of effort and the conditions in the market. The first contract
guarantees that the employee will earn between $900 and $1,000 per week,
while the second contract guarantees that the employee will earn between
$0 and $20,000 per week. In both cases, the actual payment depends on the
number of sales, observable market conditions, and so forth. Even if each
contract anticipates the same expected number of future contingencies and
the same expected payoff, the second contract is more complex than the first
contract, because the outcomes will be more variable, and this will generally
make it worthwhile for the parties to engage in more variable behavior.23
The Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997);
Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules, II J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995); Peter H.
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes. Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992). Their
definitions of complexity overlap with ours, but the focus of their arguments is very different.
22 We propose the following metric for this dimension of complexity: (1) Order the future states of
the world specified in the contract according to decreasing probability of occurrence, with the most
likely state labeled 1, the second most likely state labeled 2, and so on; (2) multiply the numerical label
for each state by the ex ante probability of that state materializing, and sum over all states. The resulting
weighted sum is a useful ordinal proxy for the complexity of the contract in terms of expected number of
contingencies. To illustrate, consider contracts A and B above. A's score would be 1 *(0.9) + 2*(0.1) 1 . 1,
whereas B would score 1*(0.5) + 2*(0.5) = 1.5. Contract C, with three equally likely states would score
1*(0.33) + 2*(0.33) + 3*(0.33) = 2, and would be more complex than B. When states are equally likely to
occur (as in contracts B and C), one can flip a coin to determine which is labeled "more likely"; the result
will be unaffected. The complexity comparison is more challenging when the contract with more states has
a less even distribution of likelihood among states. The first factor suggests it is more complex, the second
factor that it is less complex. Some quantitative measure, such as our formula, must balance the two.
23 Payment variability will have a greater impact on contract complexity when contracting parties
have more discretion to change or tailor behavior in response to that variability. If risk aversion is a
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A contract is complex along the third dimension if it imposes a signifi-
cant cognitive load on the parties; that is, if it is difficult to understand.
Additional contingencies raise the cognitive load. Evaluating the likelihood
of different contingencies arising, or even worrying about how to determine
which contingency did arise, requires mental effort. To this extent, cogni-
tive load overlaps with the other dimensions of complexity. But cognitive
load denotes something more. A detailed schedule of payment amounts
(each correlated to a different state of the world) will be more difficult to
understand than a simple payment formula (for example, a 25% commis-
sion). And a payment of $X per widget will impose less cognitive load than
an otherwise identical contract that bases payment on a fraction of profits,
which may be difficult to calculate. Thus, apart from the number of contin-
gencies and the variability of payoffs, the formulation of the terms may en-
tail different levels of complexity in terms of cognitive load.2 4
TABLE 1: DIMENSIONS OF COMPLEXITY
DIMENSION OF EXAMPLE OF SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF COMPLEX
COMPLEXITY CONTRACT CONTRACT
Number of "widget for SI" "vidget for SI if it rains, but
contingencies for S2 if it does not rain"
Variability of "widget for S1 if it rains, for "widget for SI if it rains, for
payoffs S2 if it does not rain" S 10 if it does not rain"
Cognitive load "widget for VA of your prof- "'vidget for 15% of your
its" profits beyond a normal re-
turn"
With this three-component definition (for examples, see Table 1), some
contracts that appear simple are actually complex. For example, some em-
ployment contracts appear simple, because their terms are limited to wages,
hours, and the like, but in fact they are complex. They are complex because
they incorporate an employment manual, which contains numerous provi-
sions that are likely to be applied to the actual relationship and are enforce-
able through reputation or legal sanctions that result in variable payments
and that are hard to understand. On the other hand, many contracts that
look complex are really simple. Many simple sales contracts include
lengthy boilerplate provisions, which neither party expects to apply with
concern, variability should be measured on some scale relative to the parties' wealth, as a gauge of their
concern with it.
24 Of course, what person A finds cognitively challenging may seem straightfor-ard to B, and vice
versa. In some circumstances A and B may enter into a contract of such complexity that neither fully
understands all of its details.
95:91 (2000)
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any significant probability. As a result, such boilerplate provisions do not
affect payments, and no one bothers to try to understand them.
B. Completeness
It is important to understand the relationship between completeness
and complexity. In the economics literature, a contract is complete when it
differentiates among all relevant future states of the world, and a third party,
such as a court, can verify, when necessary, which state has occurred. As a
matter of theory, one can talk about contracts being fully state-contingent,
allocating obligations efficiently for every payoff-relevant future state of the
world.2 5 We term contracts that are optimally state-contingent as "perfectly
complete" or "p-complete" contracts. The analogy is to the economist's
world of perfect markets, within which information is said to be perfect or
fully shared. Contracts that are not p-complete are said to be "p-incomplete."
For example, a contract is p-incomplete "if the parties would like to add con-
tingent clauses, but are prevented from doing so by the fact that the state of
nature cannot be verified (or because states are too expensive to describe ex
ante)." 26 Contracts may also be p-incomplete when there is asymmetric in-
formation between the contracting parties, or when other considerations,
such as maintaining trust, make fully elaborated terms undesirable.
To understand the idea of perfect completeness, imagine that a seller
wishes to sell a widget to a buyer. When delivery occurs, the widget will be
worth either $80 or $50 to the seller, the two outcomes being equally likely,
and will be worth $75 to the buyer. A p-complete contract would specify
the seller's obligations under both future states of the world: perhaps the
seller would be obliged to deliver if the widget is worth $50 to her, and to
refund the buyer's money if the widget is worth $80 to her.27 If, however,
the seller's valuation is unverifiable (for example, because neither the buyer
nor any third party can directly observe and verify the seller's valuation),
then the contract would have to be p-incomplete. It might oblige the seller
to deliver the widget independent of her valuation. In practice, much pay-
off-relevant information is unobservable to one or more parties to a trans-
action or, even if observable, not verifiable by a third party, such as a court.
Given these informational and verifiability constraints, most, if not all, real-
world contracts are p-incomplete.
2 See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEw PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts]; George 0.
Triantis, The Relevance of Unforeseen Contingencies in Commercial Contracting, In THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
26 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations ofIncomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 134
(1999). We use the term "p-incomplete" to stress its meaning, the absence of p-completeness. The term
"perfectly incomplete," which we do not use, misleadingly suggests that the contract has no termsl
27 In this paper we use "he" for party A, employers and buyers, and "she" for party B, employees
and sellers.
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A contract is "functionally complete," or "f-complete" when it per-
forms as well as it can subject to constraints on the participants' abilities to
distinguish states and the court's ability to verify which state occurred. A
state is said to be distinguishable when all parties can verify its occurrence.
In this framework, a contract is f-complete if all distinguishable states are
optimally differentiated (i.e., differentiated in the way that the p-complete
contract would differentiate them). Hence, only nondistinguishable states
are lumped together. Perfect completeness is a subset of functional com-
pleteness; all p-complete contracts are f-complete, but not vice versa. The
reverse implication is that all f-incomplete contracts are p-incomplete, but
not vice versa. Functional completeness-a more inclusive, less stringent,
and more real world concept than p-completeness-is closer to what most
non-economists mean when they describe a contract as complete.
We illustrate our completeness concepts by considering a contract for
the sale of a widget. There is a critical uncertainty about the future, i.e., mul-
tiple states of the world may occur, which allows for the possibility that an
incomplete contract could be drawn. The uncertainty is whether the widget is
cheap or expensive to produce, which also affects the value of the widget to
the buyer. If the widget proves cheap to make, it vill also be cheap for the
buyer's competitors to get an equivalent widget, and will offer the buyer little
competitive advantage, and vice versa if it is expensive. Either a normal or a
premium widget could be produced, the latter being both more beneficial to
the buyer and more costly to the seller. The costs to the seller of producing
the widget and the profit gains to the buyer are shown in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2: PAYOFFS FROM DIFFERENT WIDGET TYPES, TO ILLUSTRATE P-
AND F-COMPLETE CONTRACTS
STATE OF THE VORLD WVIDGET TYPE
I Prob. ] Normal Premium
CHEAP 2 Cost to Seller 4 7
Profit Gain to Buyer 6 8
EXPENSIVE Cost to Seller 10 15
1_ 1_Profit Gain to Buyer 12 20
At the time the contract is drawn, both parties think that the widget is
1/2 likely to be cheap to produce and 1/2 likely to be expensive. Unfortu-
nately, a court would be unable to determine whether the widget was cheap
or expensive. The p-complete contract, however, assumes all information is
monitorable and verifiable. It simply computes the optimal decision for
each state of the world. Hence, it will require a normal widget if cheap (be-
cause 6-4>8-7), and a premium widget if expensive (because 20-15>12-10).
There is a range of prices for the p-complete contract, which allow both
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parties to benefit. If prices are set to divide the net benefits, the price will
be 5 for the standard widget and 17.5 for the premium widget.
The f-complete contract, unfortunately, cannot let price (or for that
matter quantity) depend on whether the widget is cheap or expensive, since
that information is not verifiable by the court. The cheap state of the world
and the expensive state of the world are not distinguishable. Moreover,
there is no additional price for the premium widget that will get the seller to
provide it in appropriate circumstances. 28 The f-complete contract is com-
puted taking account of the likelihoods that costs will be cheap or expen-
sive. The expected costs of a standard widget will be (1/2)4 + (1/2)10 = 7,
yielding an expected benefit of (1/2)6 + (1/2)12 = 9. The premium widget
incurs expected costs of (1/2)7 + (1/2)15 = 11, and yields expected benefits
of (1/2)8 + (1/2)20 = 14. Since 14-11 > 9-7, the f-complete contract calls
for a premium widget. The price will be somewhere between 11 and 14, so
that both parties benefit. The contract is not state-contingent, i.e., it does
not make the seller and buyer's obligations contingent on whether the state
of the world turns out to be one in which the widget is cheap or expensive. 9
Let us relate these results to our complexity discussion. Using our
definitions of complexity and functional completeness, contracts can be di-
vided into four categories, as illustrated in Table 3 below:




A simple and functionally complete contract (A) would contain explicit
terms that did not vary across many different future states, because such
variation was not necessary to efficiency (perhaps because the environment
was simple or most relevant distinctions between states were nonverifiable).
A complex and f-complete contract (C) would contain different terms for
many future states, or sets of states when they cannot be distinguished, with
terms covering obligations for every distinguishable set of states that merits
28 If the price difference is greater than 3, she will provide the premium widget in the cheap state, If
it is less than 5, she will not provide it in the expensive state. Both of these outcomes are inefficient.
Hence, the price must simultaneously be 3 or less and 5 or greater, which is impossible.
29 For an example of an f-incomplete contract, imagine that there is a third state, under which both
normal and premium widgets are very expensive, and that this state is distinguishable from the other two
(nondistinguishable) states. An f-complete contract would contain different obligations for the cheap
and expensive set of states, on the one hand, and for the very expensive state, on the other, an f-
incomplete contract would not distinguish the very expensive state from the other two states.
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distinctive treatment. A simple and f-incomplete contract (B) would con-
tain few terms and these would fail to apply to some verifiable future states.
A complex and f-incomplete contract (D) would contain many terms, but
these would nonetheless fail to differentiate among some distinguishable
future states that merit distinctive treatment. This shows that completeness
and complexity measure separate dimensions of a contract; one is not re-
ducible to the other.30
Note that in practice one might not be sure whether a general statement
was supposed to apply to any future state, to apply only to a few future
states, or to exclude only a few future states. This is a recurrent problem in
contractual interpretation. As a result, it may sometimes be difficult to de-
cide whether a simple contract is f-complete (its few terms apply to all dis-
tinguishable states) or is f-incomplete (its few terms apply to only a few
distinguishable states).'
C. Optimality
From the parties' point of view, a contract is optimal if it assigns obli-
gations efficiently across all possible future states. Thus, in the absence of
transaction costs, only a p-complete contract can be optimal; a p-incomplete
contract cannot be optimal unless there are constraints on contracting. Once
such constraints arise, what economists label a first-best outcome will no
longer be achievable. Second-best optimality-the best that can be done
subject to constraints-becomes the Holy Grail. In such circumstances, the
optimality of a contract will require a balance between transaction costs and
30 In the example given in Table 2, the p-complete contract involves more states of the world (2)
than the f-complete contract (1), but has less variable net payoffs to the players, and is simpler to spec-
ify, Le., imposes less cognitive load at the drafting stage. Thus, p-complete contracts will often b: more
complex on our first dimension, number of relevant states, since more states can b: distinguished. They
will generally be less complex on our third dimension, since f-complete contracts involve consideration
of the probabilities of alternative states that are nonverifiable both in drawing the contract and in decid-
ing how to act under the contract. As more states are added, p-complete contracts remain conceptually
simple; they merely compute what is best for each possible state. By contrast, f-complete contracts can
become extremely complicated, possibly because each player has to draw inferences about the likeli-
hood of alternative states from the actions of the other.
31 We emphasize that it is important to judge a contract relative to the contracting envirnmnt. Con-
sider a world in which there are three Environments, 1, 2, and 3, ranked in order of increasing complexity.
In Environment 1, a simple single clause in a contract will be sufficient to cover obligations efficiently
100% of the time; in Environment 2, the same contract will cover obligations 9% of the tim:; and in Envi-
ronment 3 that contract will cover obligations only 20- of the time. A contract that includes only a single
simple clause can be p-complete (and therefore f-complete) in Environment 1-Le., it vould b- a t)7e "A"
contract in Table 2. In the other two Environments, such a contract would necessarily be p-incomplete.
Nevertheless, the single clause contract is closer to complete in Environment 2 than it is in Environment
3. A complex contract, which would add multiple clauses to the simple one, could be p-complete in any
of the Environments, although the complexity would be useless in Environment 1. Thus, both com-
pleteness and complexity fall along a continuum, and for both concepts it is important to judge a con-
tract in expected value terms (i.e., weighting contingencies by their ex ante probabilities).
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losses due to contracting inefficiency.3 2 For example, given the positive
transaction costs of drafting complex clauses, a simple contract, rather than a
complex one with many unimportant details, will be optimal in a simple en-
vironment. Reputation and trust may be efficient substitutes for the complex
clauses that are valuable in more complex environments. Under these cir-
cumstances, an f-complete contract and even, we will argue, an f-incomplete
contract may be optimal. Later in this paper we explore in greater detail the
circumstances that can make simple contracts optimal. First we discuss why
scholars have usually assumed that complex contracts are optimal.
D. The Theoretical Basis for Contractual Complexity
The puzzle that motivates this paper is that a large and sophisticated
body of work, primarily produced by economists, implies that contracts
should be complex, whereas in fact they are generally simple.33 According
to this literature, there are two main reasons why contracts should be com-
plex. We discuss these reasons, then add a third of particular interest to le-
gal audiences.
First, contracts should be complex because of uncertainty about the
contractual environment.34 When parties enter a contract, they allocate ob-
ligations across different possible states of the world, and the number of
possible states of the world is infinite. Suppose that a seller values a widget
at $100, and the buyer values the widget at $200. They should enter a con-
tract to exchange the widget for some amount between $100 and $200.
However, suppose that in one possible future state of the world the buyer
values the widget at only $50. Then the optimal contract would stipulate
that the buyer does not have to buy the widget if that state occurs. If, in an-
other possible future state of the world, the seller values the widget at $250,
in that state the seller should not have to deliver the widget. Rather than a
simple contract, according to which the parties agree to exchange the wid-
get for a sum of money, efficiency requires a complex contract that releases
one or both parties from their obligations if certain future states prevail. As
more possible future states get taken into account, the optimal contract be-
comes even more complex. For example, if one or both parties can increase
the value of the contract by making certain investments or taking certain
precautions, the optimal contract would stipulate that the parties must make
32 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937). Transaction costs are frequently seen as
the primary or even sole reason for contractual incompleteness. See Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts,
supra note 25, at 280. To the extent that some terms may become verifiable at a given cost, whether a
contract is functionally complete may also depend on transaction costs.
33 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 5 (1995); JEAN-JACQUES
LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION (1993);
BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 128-29 (1997).
34 A general discussion, with citations to the large literature, can be found in DAVID M. KREPs, A
COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY Ch. 16 (1990).
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those investments or take those precautions in different states of the world.
None of these complexities would be necessary if the parties could predict
the future with certainty. The contract would simply state the appropriate
allocation of obligations for the predicted future state.
Second, complexity in a contract is often an appropriate response to in-
formation asymmetry and monitoring difficulties. Suppose that an em-
ployer hires a person to sell widgets. If the employer could observe the
amount of effort that the employee uses when selling widgets, an acceptable
contract might be very simple: a fixed payment if the employee engages in
the appropriate level of effort, and nothing otherwise. But usually the em-
ployer -vil not be able to observe effort directly, and the outcome of the
employee's effort (the number of widgets sold) might be a product of
chance as well as effort. In such a case, the optimal contract will generally
specify different levels of compensation depending on the number of wid-
gets sold.35 The employer and employee might agree that if a large number
of widgets is sold, the employee will receive a large sum, and if a small
number of widgets is sold, the employee will receive a small sum. Thus,
the optimal contract becomes more complex. If the employee is risk-
averse, or has hidden characteristics that the employer wants to screen, the
contract may become still more complex, as it will have to provide for risk-
sharing and possibly terms that make the contract unattractive for potential
employees with undesirable characteristics.36
The third explanation for contractual complexity is as a response to
government policy, what we will call "political economy." Parties fre-
quently enter complex and convoluted contracts in the hope of avoiding tax
liability, or other forms of liability such as responsibility for environmental
harm. To ensure a profit despite interest-rate ceilings created by usury
laws, lenders may require payment in the form of points or fees, or they
may reconfigure contracts as leases or conditional sales. To maintain an
acceptable level of risk despite restrictions on coercive remedies,37 lenders
may insist on a contract that specifies how the borrower operates its busi-
ness or uses its assets while the loan remains unpaid. These gambits require
additional terms, hence additional complexity. The common-law suspicion
of arbitration may have discouraged parties from using simple contracts that
use terms of art accessible to arbitrators rather than complex contracts with
lengthy provisions needed to instruct courts. Still other examples of com-
plexifying doctrines are the parol evidence rule, which bars courts from en-
forcing promises made during precontractual negotiations, and the plain
meaning rule, which bars courts from using evidence from precontractual
negotiations for the purpose of interpreting contracts. Because these rules
35 See, e.g., ANDREUMAS-COLELI, ET A.., MICROECONOMIC THEORY CI. 14 (1995).
36 sei
37 See, e-g., Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (2000) (prohibiting certain contractual provi-
sions that facilitate collection of debts).
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harm parties who fail to put all terms in writing, they encourage parties to
write more detailed and complex contracts. 8
Contract doctrines do not always push toward complexity. Certain
doctrines of contract law may penalize sophisticated parties that draft com-
plex contracts. The unconscionability doctrine and related doctrines are
used to strike down contracts that are too complicated for consumers to un-
derstand.39  These doctrines are also sometimes applied to contracts in-
volving two sophisticated parties.40 Contract drafters might respond by
issuing simple contracts that are inefficiently p-incomplete but that will not
provoke the ire of a court.4 ' Similar points can be made about other areas
of the law. Labor law prevents workers from negotiating individual con-
tracts that are different from, and possibly more complex than, the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.42  Employment laws governing hours, pay, and
benefits reduce the dimensions along which parties can negotiate different
terms. Mergers might be simplified in order to make the deals transparent
to the regulators and shareholders who must approve them. Nevertheless,
concerns about regulatory authorities and judicial interpretation of contracts
will often produce complex contracts.
All these considerations raise the question at the heart of our inquiry:
Why are contracts in general simpler than the discussion of uncertainty,
asymmetry of information, and political economy above suggests they
should be?
38 By contrast, in areas where these rules are liberally construed, parties can enter simple contracts
on the assumption that courts will complete the contract by deriving optimal terms from precontractual
evidence. Of course, this assumes that the parties think that courts will do a good job. If they think
courts are likely to misunderstand the precontractual negotiations, they will add merger clauses, which
state that no precontractual promises are enforceable.
39 The classic case is Jenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (striking
down a warranty disclaimer in part because it was hard to understand).
40 See, ag., Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. 1986) (holding unconscion-
able a termination clause in a contract between two merchants).
41 An expert on doing business in Argentina advises American business that "relatively sophisti.
cated" Argentine buyers are likely to "prefer to sign complicated documents in English rather than a
simple draft," because "ifa detailed and complex English contract is used for a sale, the buyer can easily
claim a lack of understanding of the contract," and thus be able to escape liability for breach in Argen-
tine courts. Lewis Flax, Handling Credit and Collection Issues When Exporting to Argentina, in
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AND COLLECTIONS 1 (May 1999).
42 Such provisions protect the power of unions and make it difficult for employers to differentiate
among employees in ways that would undermine solidarity. For example, they prevent an employer
from offering the better employees a superior contract, which would reduce the bargaining power of the
union for the worse employees.
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III. WHY CONTRACTS ARE SIMPLE
A. Lack of Environmental Complexity
We pointed out above that environmental complexity is a main reason
for contractual complexity. It follows that a simple environment will pro-
duce simple contracts. Although this may seem to be an obvious point, it
has an important implication. Suppose that a court is faced with two differ-
ent contracts that appear to have the same level of simplicity. If one con-
tract emerged from a simple environment while the other contract emerged
from a complex environment, then it is possible that, even though the con-
tracts appear equally simple, the first contract is f-complete while the sec-
ond contract is not. This, in turn, has implications for how the court should
enforce the contract.
As an example, compare a requirements contract-a contract in which
a seller promises to supply all the requirements of a buyer-with a one-time
sale of goods. Both kinds of contract specify a price that the buyer must
pay, and both kinds of contract provide either a quantity or a manner for
determining quantity, so they may appear equally simple. But the require-
ments relationship is much more complex than a one-time sale. As time
passes, the seller's costs and the buyer's needs change in complicated and
unpredictable ways. Although a p-complete requirements contract would
contain multiple terms to govern these alternative states, real requirements
contracts often say nothing about them. Thus, two contracts with similar lev-
els of simplicity may reflect different levels of completeness, the difference
being attributable to the different levels of complexity in the environment.
As this example illustrates, contracts of similar complexity may be
produced in environments of different complexity. But the level of envi-
ronmental complexity, although important, does not by itself determine the
level of complexity of a contract. To understand why contracting parties
choose simpler or more complex contracts, and how the chosen contract
corresponds to what would be optimal, we need to consider other factors.
B. Negotiation Costs
In the legal literature, the standard explanation for the f-incompleteness
of contracts is that during negotiations parties cannot anticipate all contin-
gencies; when they anticipate a contingency, it may be expensive to agree
on the allocation of obligations if that contingency occurs; and even if they
can agree, it may be difficult to formulate orally or write down a term that
would properly reflect this allocation. Given these "negotiation costs,"
parties will rationally enter legally enforceable contracts that are full of
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gaps, because the negotiation costs exceed the additional value that a more
f-complete contract would confer on the parties.43
This explanation for contractual gaps can be carried over to our inquiry
into contractual simplicity. A contract may be simple because negotiation
costs prevent parties from specifying detailed contingencies, determining an
appropriate distribution of payments, or calculating difficult compensation
formulas.
That negotiation costs can be an important determinant of contract
form is illustrated by cases involving low-probability contingencies. Sev-
eral such cases arose after an international incident resulted in the closing of
the Suez Canal, which led to large, unanticipated increases in the cost of
shipping goods between East Asia and the West under existing contracts.44
The contracts did not contain clauses that allocated obligations in the case
of closure of the Suez Canal because no one anticipated that the Suez Canal
would be closed. It is possible, however, that if parties had invested enough
money in anticipating low-probability contingencies, they would have in-
cluded a clause covering this contingency. In this way negotiation costs led
to contractual simplicity (as well as f-incompleteness), which in turn re-
sulted in legal disputes.
When negotiation costs are high relative to the value of a transaction,
parties will not find it worthwhile to negotiate complex terms. For idiosyn-
cratic transactions, the resulting contracts are likely to be simple. On the
other hand, when there are many parties on one side of the contract (such as
consumers checking into a hotel or trying a new phone service), economies
of scale and market discipline may allow complexity. The firm will invest
in detailed terms because the contract governs transactions that have great
value in aggregate. Although negotiation costs would preclude any one
consumer from negotiating detailed terms, "the many" can take comfort
from the assumption that the more assiduous among them have examined
the detailed industry contract and found it acceptable.45
Despite the importance of negotiation costs, they have a limited ability
to explain contractual simplicity. Often two parties will have plenty of time
and capacity to write detailed contractual terms, but choose not to do so.
This has led several authors to argue that additional reasons are necessary
for contractual p-incompleteness, 4 and we make the same argument about
contractual simplicity.
43 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 104-05 (5th ed. 1998); Steven Shavell,
Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 436, 438 (Peter New-
man ed., 1998); Ronald A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT'L ECON. REv. 233, 234 (1985).
4 See, eg., American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
45 See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of imperfect Information:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
46 See HART, supra note 33, at 5; Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 25, at 280. As a re-
sult, complex contracts should be associated with thin markets. When markets are robust, (1) parties
have less uncertainty about the nature of goods and services, which are standardized; and (2) parties rely
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C. Asymmetric Information
One party to a contract frequently has more information about future
states of the world than does the other party. This is known as "asymmetric
information." Suppose that the informed party can predict a future state,
propose a jointly beneficial allocation of obligations in that future state, and
reduce that proposal to a clear and coherent term in the contract at low cost.
It follows that negotiation costs do not prevent the parties from adding that
term to the contract. Yet the informed party might decline to add the term
to the contract, with the result that the contract is simpler than it would oth-
erwise be. There are several reasons for this behavior.
One reason is that by proposing the term the informed party might re-
veal information to the other party that it wants to keep secret. Consider an
example based on the case of Hadley v. Baxendale.4 7 If a shipper demands
a warranty from a carrier, the carrier might realize that the shipper places a
high value on the shipment. If the carrier has market power, it can charge a
high price. To avoid being victimized by such price discrimination, the
shipper opts for the standard contract offered by the carrier, which is sim-
pler because it does not contain a warranty.4 8 Appropriate default rules
might discourage such behavior, but there is little reason to think that the
behavior can be avoided altogether.49 Simplicity, then, is the result of stra-
tegic concealment of information.5
For another reason why an informed party might not reveal information,
imagine an employer and employee trying to agree on an appropriate com-
mission rate for sales. If the original or industry reference commission rate is
25%, then the employee might suspect that an employer proposing a 40%
commission rate above some floor sales level knows that low sales are likely.
Similarly, if the employer proposes to stay with the flat 25% commission rate
although higher rates above a floor have been discussed or used previously,
the employee may suspect that the employer expects sales to be high. The
less on each other because the market provides close substitutes, so they need not insert multiple terms
in the contract in order to protect themselves against opportunism.
47 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
48 But not necessarily: an apparently simple contract, with say one term, might be complex because
the environment is highly variable, so payoffs vary greatly as well. It is possible (even likely) that a
contract with a second term would release one party (say, the uninformed party) when that party's pay-
off is extremely low. If so, the two-term contract is simpler along the payoff variability dimnsion even
if more complex along the number ofterms dimension. They are "complexity non-comparable."
49 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989); Lucian Aiye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and he Scope
ofLiabilityfor Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L ECO.. & ORG. 284 (1991).
50 A similar outcome results when parties are negotiating over the sale of technological information:
"merely informing a potential buyer about one's product gives away a great deal ofthe benefit. Hene, in-
formation is shared alongside sheaves ofnondisclosure agreements, and, even then, there is rtleetive hding
of critical components. Frequently prototypes are demonstrated, but inner workings may b_ hidden, rmuh
as magic stores demonstrate an illusion but not its working mechanism." RJ. Zeckhauser, The Challenge
of Contractingfor Technological Information, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. US. 12,743, 12,744 (1996).
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employee will be less suspicious if the proposed contract is a standard con-
tract, rather than one ostensibly tailored to today's individual circumstances,
because a simple standard contract, which applies to heterogeneous circum-
stances, is less likely to exploit individualized asymmetric information about
prospective sales. Therefore, asymmetry of information may lead parties to
use equivalent contracts over a broad range of circumstances, even though
optimality would require heterogeneous and context-specific contracts.
Asymmetric information is also important because it causes parties to
establish monitoring mechanisms and special institutional arrangements such
as trust-based relationships, and these devices have an independent impact on
the simplicity of contracts. We discuss them in subparts II.D and II.G, below.
D. Monitoring Dynamics
As we noted earlier, in a simple agency model with a single risk-averse
agent performing a single task in a complex environment, the optimal con-
tract is complex. However, many contracts do not fit this model. A well-
known example involves an agency relationship where the agent must en-
gage in two tasks, one of which cannot be monitored and the other of which
can be monitored imperfectly. The model shows that the optimal contract
might be quite simple, requiring the payment of a fixed sum to the agent
upon completion of the task. "The desirability of providing incentives for
any one activity decreases with the difficulty of measuring performance in
any other activities that make competing demands on the agent's time and
attention."'' The principal-agent model of "multitasking," therefore, illus-
trates how monitoring difficulties (which are the result of asymmetric in-
formation) can push toward contract simplicity.
For example, suppose that a firm hires a contractor to repair some ma-
chinery. The firm wants the machinery repaired carefully and it wants the
machinery repaired quickly, but the firm can accurately monitor only the
speed of repair. The problem with a complex contract that makes compen-
sation a function of the speed of repair is that it would encourage the con-
tractor to repair the machinery quickly but sloppily. A simpler contract that
paid the contractor a fixed fee would, under certain assumptions, give the
contractor better incentives.52 So sometimes simplicity is the best response to
51 Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, As-
set Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,26 (1991).
52 See id. Bajari and Tadelis, supra note 12, seek to explain the prevalence of simple cost-plus and
fixed-price contracts, and the rarity of more complex incentive contracts, drawing on evidence from the
private construction industry. They argue that a fixed-price contract offers the advantages of giving
better incentives for cost control and not requiring the buyer to monitor costs, but has the disadvantage
of leading to friction from renegotiation when changes are required. A cost-plus contract, by contrast, is
advantaged for allowing smooth adjustment to changes, but disadvantaged by requiring that the buyer
monitor costs and giving the seller little incentive for cost control. Given the "lumpiness" of fixed costs
associated with any deviation from pure cost-plus or pure fixed-price contracts, simple extreme contracts
are preferred, over a wide range of circumstances, to more complex, intermediate incentive contracts.
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a complex environment with informational asymmetry. Examples include
employment contracts for professors53 and for many other professionals.
Monitoring dynamics might also push toward simplicity when a single
principal has multiple agents. Employers often decline to offer individual-
ized contracts to each employee, instead using general contracts that do not
differ among employees as much as the standard agency model predicts.
One reason that employers do this may be that when employees have differ-
ent complex contracts, they have trouble determining whether the employer
fulfills his promises to each employee, while the employer wants to be able
to maintain a reputation for doing just that.5 4 A similar argument can be
made when a single agent (such as a real estate agent) has multiple princi-
pals, and fears that individualized contracts might lead principals to believe
that the agent is shirking in one relationship (the sale of a cheap house) in
order to devote more time to another relationship that is more lucrative (the
sale of an expensive house).55
In addition, employers may offer simple equal wage schedules, rather
than the complex incentive contracts recommended by agency theory (such
as pay based on comparative performance), to prevent competition among
employees where it might prove detrimental. If employers do not know
what level of output to expect from their workers, theory suggests it may be
optimal to conduct a contest, and pay employees on a comparative perform-
ance basis.56 This theory implicitly assumes that cooperation does not pro-
mote output. When cooperation is important, a simple wage schedule may
promote it, whereas contests could even lead to sabotage. Edward Lazear
argues, for example, that one reason why workers and firms agree on simple
equal wage schedules, rather than highly differentiated wage contracts con-
tingent on worker performance, is that pay inequality discourages coopera-
tive behavior when there is an element of relative performance evaluation:
53 A university and a faculty member typically do not contract on all of the verifiable asp-ts of their
relationship, partly to induce good behavior along nonverifiable dimensions, such as faculty effort: "the ex-
tensive degree of incompleteness in the specification of the university's obligations to the faculty member
(e.g., secretarial support, office location, current and future salary) arises from the need to encourage the
faculty member's effort. With a complete contract, the faculty member would have recourse to the courts if
the university reneged on its contractual obligations, but the university would have no recourse if the faculty
member shirked [since effort is nonverifiable]. Giving the Dean discretion helps to create appropriate in-
centives.. and the overall relationship works better (joint surplus is increased)." B. Douglas Bzrnhim &
Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECO.. REv. 902, 904 (1993).
5 See David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, In PEISPECTWES ON POSITIVE
PotlCAL ECONOmy (J. Alt & Y. Shepsle eds., 1990); for evidence, see Baker ct al., supra note 14, at 953.
55 See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts In Agency Arrangements: Lawyers. Real Estate
Brokers; Underwriters and Other Agents'Rewards, 36 J.L & ECON. 503 (1993).
5 See J. Green & N. Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments and Contests, 91 J. POL ECON. 349
(1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982): B. Nalebuff & J. Sti-
glitz, Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J.
ECON. 21 (1983); Mary O'Keeffe et al., Economic Contests: Comparatim Reward Schemes, 2 J. LAB.
ECON. 27 (1984).
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"If harmony is important, pay compression is optimal on strict efficiency
grounds. 57 Since most employee compensation arrangements involve some
element of comparative performance measurement, simple employment con-
tracts should be common.
E. Evolutionary Pressures and Forms
When parties are symmetrically but poorly informed about future states
of the world, they might rely on simple form contracts rather than negotiat-
ing complex contracts from scratch. The parties rely on the form contract,
and do not vary it, because they assume that the form contract, even if sim-
pler, is closer to the optimal contract than their own personalized, complex
contract would be. The form contract is attractive because it reflects the ac-
cumulated wisdom of parties who have used the contract in the past. And,
as discussed in subpart III.G. below, the use of the standard contract also
engenders trust relative to the back-and-forth of negotiating terms favorable
to one party or the other that a personalized contract would require.
But why wouldn't the form contract be complex? It might be, but
there are evolutionary pressures that favor simplicity. There are two steps
to the argument. First, observe that the process of agreeing to a set of con-
tractual terms is a coordination game, in the sense that each party might be
indifferent among a range of contractual terms and want only to avoid the
costs from failing to agree on the same ones. For example, a seller and
buyer might be indifferent between (1) a contract that has a price of $100
and stipulates the law of state X in case of dispute, and (2) a contract that
has a price of $99 and stipulates the law of state Y in case of dispute. To
avoid negotiation costs, each party may submit a form containing the terms
that it favors. (Typically, the buyer will include its form with the order and
the seller will include its form with the delivery.) If the forms do not
match, the parties either must engage in costly negotiations to eliminate in-
consistencies, or take the risk that if a dispute arises, a court would hold that
the contract is invalid or enforce the other party's form. The result is a clas-
sic "Battle of the Sexes" game:
TABLE 4: COORDINATING ON FORMS
(Numbers are payoffs to Row, Column)
COLUMN'S CHOICE
Row's form Column's form
Row's Row's form 3,2 1, 1
CHOICE Column's form 1, I 2,3
57 Edward P. Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561, 579 (1989).
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The payoffs in Table 4 above assume that each party prefers its own
form, but that both parties prefer coordination on a single form over a fail-
ure to coordinate ss Imagine that Row is one person, and Column repre-
sents any member of a group of others with whom Row does business.
Row's problem is that it would like to use its own form, but it risks the
worst payoff if others use their own forms when Row uses its own. And if
Row adopts Column's form in the hope of avoiding the worst payoff, it
might turn out that Column has chosen Row's form because it expects Row
to choose its own form. Diverse solutions to this problem are available, but
one clear solution is an industry standard form, which all parties would use.
The second step of the argument is to explain why this coordination
game would lead to simple rather than complex standard forms. Suppose
that at any particular time, many forms circulate as possible industry stan-
dards. When two merchants match up, each submits one of these forms. If
the forms do not match, the parties incur a cost: either they must renegoti-
ate or they take the risk that a court will refuse to enforce the contract, or
will enforce the wrong form, if a dispute arises. Suppose further that the
forms can differ along two dimensions: choice of law (X or Y), or choice
of forum (A or B). A simple contract specifies only one dimension (choice
of law); a complex contract specifies two. It follows that there are only two
simple contracts (X or Y), while there are four complex contracts (XA, XB,
YA, YB). If a merchant is not sure what forms are being used by other
merchants, it may make sense to use a simple form because there are fewer
degrees of freedom. If other merchants use simple forms, then the prob-
ability of coordination is reasonably high (1/2), even if both merchants
choose at random. By contrast, if merchants use complex forms, the prob-
ability of coordination is low (1/4). If merchants use relatively simple
forms in order to maximize the chance of coordination, then over time sim-
ple forms will prevail over complex forms. But there will be a lower limit
for simplicity, below which the form will not contain enough information,
or will be highly inefficient in catering to unusual circumstances. This
lower limit on simplicity is likely to be stable over time.
59
Form contracts are common. Often, they are produced by trade associa-
tions; parties rely heavily on the form and make minor adjustments to suit
their circumstances. At other times, a large business uses the same contrac-
tual form for multiple customers.60 Another example of the wide reliance on
58 Thus, we do not assume that the payoffs are necessarily symmetrical. For a discussion of the
Battle of the Sexes, see ROBERT GIBBONS, GAMETHEORY FOR APPLIED ECONONICS 11-12 (1992).
59 For a discussion of evolutionary arguments, see H. Peyton Young, The Economics of tomievnon, 10
J. ECON. PERPs. 105 (1996). Young argues that 50-50 division (for cxample its prealence in sharecrop-
ping contracts) can be explained by the fact that this rule is the unique stochastically stable comntlon (Le,
convention that is robust under small, persistent random shocks) under certain plausible circumstanes.
60 See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2"s Incorporation StrateV:' A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
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form contracts comes from oil drilling agreements. These contracts almost
always involve two components: (1) a short (one to five page) deal memo-
randum, laying out the essential business features specific to the particular
transaction; and (2) an operating agreement, modified only slightly from deal
to deal, that runs twenty to thirty pages. Operating agreements come in sev-
eral standard forms that differ by state (since oil laws differ among states).61
The common-law mirror image rule holds that a contract is not formed
unless the offer and acceptance are identical.62 Section 2-207 of the U.C.C.
holds that a contract is formed even if some terms differ.63 Although the
interpretation of these rules is shrouded in difficulties, 64 it is fair to say that
courts are more likely to deny formation of a contract after an exchange of
differing forms under the mirror image rule than under 2-207. This means
that the cost of failure to coordinate is higher under the mirror image rule
than under 2-207. Under the evolutionary story described above, the result
is that parties have a weaker incentive to choose simple forms under 2-207
than under the mirror image rule, because the advantage of simple forms-
that they facilitate coordination-is reduced. A testable implication is that,
holding everything else equal (which may not be possible), forms used in
commercial contracts are more complex (and less uniform) than forms used
in noncommercial contracts.65
F. Convention
Many nonlegal norms and conventions govern commercial life. Con-
sider the convention of fairness. People seem to have an intuitive sense of
how to divide an unexpected surplus or loss. Often, the fair result is to di-
vide the surplus or loss in half. At other times, the fair result is to give a
larger portion to one of the parties-for example, the party that contributed
more, or the party that is in the more vulnerable position. Fairness conven-
tions enable parties to rely on simpler contracts than they could in the ab-
sence of such conventions.
To understand how fairness conventions permit contractual simplicity,
imagine that two parties plan to enter a long-term contractual relationship.
The contractual environment is complex, and predicting certain future con-
tingencies would be costly. When an unpredictable contingency occurs, it
will generate a surplus or a loss that must be distributed in some way be-
tween the parties. If the parties gain from continuing the relationship, they
61 We are grateful to Malcolm Brachman, President, Northwest Oil Company, for this example.
62 See, eg., Langellier v. Schaefer, 36 Minn. 361 (1887).
63 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1998).
6 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295-310 (1982).
65 Another possibility is that courts do not deny formation under the mirror image rule, but instead
assume that delivery is acceptance of the buyer's form, if the buyer's form differs from the seller's ini-
tial form. In this case, the choice between the rules probably does not matter at all, except that the com-
plexity of 2-207 creates needless uncertainty.
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will want to resolve the question of distribution as efficiently as possible,
yet this goal is in tension with each party's desire to obtain as large a por-
tion of the pie as possible. In the absence of a mechanism for resolving the
question of distribution, the parties will waste time and money jockeying
for a superior bargaining position, bluffing, and so on. One mechanism is a
highly complex contract that allocates shares of the surplus or loss under as
many future contingencies as can be identified and described. But the par-
ties can avoid the costs of producing such a contract if they can rely on fair-
ness conventions. Fairness might require that every surplus or loss should
be divided in half (subject to explicit allocations in the contract). If such a
convention prevails, the parties might rationally rely on the convention
rather than aggressively bargain for a larger share of the distribution, be-
cause they anticipate that their fair share of the large pie will exceed any
larger share of a smaller pie that they might obtain by aggressive bargain-
ing. If this is the case, the parties can avoid the expense of a complex con-
tract and rely on a simple contract instead.
For example, suppose that a landlord and a tenant enter a contract that
provides for renegotiation of the rent after five years. At the end of those five
years, the tenant is likely to value the premises more than any alternative ten-
ant, creating the opportunity for the landlord and the tenant to divide a large
surplus if they agree on a new price. The parties face the danger, however,
that they will dissipate the surplus by jockeying for a superior bargaining po-
sition and delaying or threatening to end negotiations, or by failing to reach
agreement so that the tenant must move. If, however, they both have a sense
of what is a fair division of the surplus, this sense of fairness may provide a
focal point around which they bargain, enabling them to reach agreement
quickly.66 Of course, the parties might enter negotiations with different or bi-
ased ideas of what is fair, and this would interfere with rather than promote a
negotiated solution, but over time fairness conventions tend to converge.6
G. Trust and Reputation
People almost always enter into contracts within a larger context of
norms and nonlegal sanctions. Contractual relationships both reflect this
larger context and independently contribute to or impede the creation of
trust between the parties. For many reasons, trust and nonlegal sanctions
encourage the formation of simple contracts.
One useful model of trust treats it as an attribute of relationships in
which two parties in a repeated prisoner's dilemma cooperate rather than
risk retaliation. These parties may share a general understanding of the ob-
ligations on both sides and the distribution of surpluses and losses, but they
do not need to enter a complex contract governing these issues because they
66 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLiCr 57 (1960) (defining focal point).
6 See Young, supra note 59.
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trust each other to refrain from acts that transfer value to themselves but
shrink the size of the pie. They trust each other in part because they know
that if one party cheats, the other party will retaliate by ending the relation-
ship and possibly badmouthing the cheater's reputation. It is easy to see
why these parties' contracts will be simple. Although there may be innu-
merable payoff-relevant states where an optimal contract would allocate
obligations, as long as the payoffs in those states are relatively low com-
pared to the payoff from continued cooperation, the threat of retaliation will
deter opportunism, so allocations in these states need not be specified by
contract. The contract need deal only with states in which the payoffs are
very high, for it is in these states that the threat of retaliation may not deter
a party from engaging in opportunism. 68 The shadow of the future can sub-
stitute for the fixed costs of designing complex contingent contracts. Re-
putational effects, combined with renegotiation as circumstances change,
cannot support all efficient contracts (such as those with large up-front re-
lationship-specific investments, which then become vulnerable to hold up),
but they can go a long way toward explaining why simple contracts are not
nearly as far from the optimum as standard economic models imply.
69
This point holds for multiple contracts, not just for a long-term con-
tract. If a contractor is going to do a single job for a person, it may be im-
portant to specify what happens in a great range of contingencies. But if
there are likely to be many jobs, a fixed price or hourly contract may do just
fine, since a shared sense of fair play is what is likely to make the relation-
ship go forward. If the initial round is unfair, subsequent payments may be
adjusted so that both sides are happy.70
68 Recall also our earlier point that fairness norms or industry conventions will resolve conflicts
over the distribution of surpluses as they are generated, obviating the need for complex terms that spec-
ify distributions in advance.
69 Early work by Rubinstein and others on the simple principal-agent model showed that in the ab-
sence of discounting and with an infinite horizon to the agency relationship, a first-best solution (Le.,
simultaneously providing correct incentives and involving completely efficient risk sharing) is possible.
Ariel Rubinstein, An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Acci-
dent, in APPLIED GAME THEORY 406 (S. Brains et al. eds., 1979). The key insight is that with repeated
outcomes, the principal can eventually infer the agent's hidden action (effort level) very closely from the
average of past observations; with an infinite horizon, agent shirking will eventually be detected. Antici-
pating punishment when or if discovered engaging in moral hazard, the agent performs optimally from the
beginning. This incentive would be lost if the relationship were based on a series of short-term contracts
(for example, with different principals in each period), unless reputation effects are strong enough for the
different principals all to become aware of the agent's previous behavior.
70 For example, Director Steven Spielberg paid Tom Stoppard $120,000 for helping to edit the
screenplay for "Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade." When the film became a huge success, Spielberg
sent Stoppard a $1 million thank-you bonus. See Stephen Dubner, Steven the Good, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
February 14, 1999, at 38. Spielberg may have made the noncontracted additional payment simply be-
cause he is an honorable person, or because Stoppard is a friend; but in any case such payment helps to
maintain a reputation for trustworthiness that encourages mutually beneficial long-term relationships.
(Indeed, when questioned about the nature of his character, Spielberg responded by starting to recite the
Boy Scout moral code: "I'm trustworthy, I'm loyal.. ." Id.).
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For certain types of contracts that are complicated and multidimen-
sional, such as marriages or friendships, the benefit from adding an addi-
tional term (even initially) may be extremely low or negative. It is too easy
for parties to evade a specified obligation by threatening to violate an un-
specified obligation that emerges postcontract and that the other party val-
ues more than any specified obligation. Because of this, there is no point in
specifying the obligations in the first place. At the extreme, the terms are
so low-value relative to unspecified obligations that parties do not bother to
specify any term except generally that they are entering a relationship. This
is common with marriages when parties forgo the option of entering a pre-
nuptial contract.
Reputation and trust are important reasons why complexity of con-
tractual form does not necessarily increase with contract duration and its as-
sociated uncertainties. Two forces may create greater complexity for
medium-term contracts than for short or long. First, for one-time or short-
period contracts, negotiation and drafting costs may outweigh the benefit of
complexity, pushing toward simple contracts. For multiple interactions, the
economic value of specifying a detailed contract will begin to outweigh the
one-time drafting costs. Thus, complexity may increase in contract dura-
tion initially. Second, and cutting in the other direction, reputations and
trust are acquired and maintained in relationships with repeated interactions
(with one or several other parties). As the duration of interaction grows, re-
putational effects that govern longer-term relationships (i.e., the ability to
punish breach through loss of reputation) may begin to substitute for formal
contractual complexity. For a given economic stake in the contract, the high-
est level of formal complexity will be optimal when duration is long enough
for drafting costs to be quite spread out, but not long enough for reputation
effects to substitute too much for formal complexity. Higher negotiation
costs and faster acquisition and loss of reputations push toward simplicity.
Contracts also might be simple because parties propose simple con-
tracts, or decline to propose additional terms to simple contracts that are on
the table, in order to signal that they are trustworthy. This idea can be
cashed out in many ways. Assume, for example, that there are two types of
sellers in a market, "bad" types and "good" types. It costs the bad type little
to distort the signal of their production costs, whereas a good type faces
high costs to distort. If there is a difference in risk aversion, it would be
optimal to make the price contingent on the signal of cost, but this "complex"
contract may not emerge in equilibrium. "Simple" noncontingent contracts
will prevail when consumers rationally anticipate that the bad-type sellers are
more likely to propose a contingent contract (conditioning the sales price on
the manipulated cost signal), and bad types respond by offering the same
simple contract that the good types offer. Among models that detail circum-
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stances under which proposing a complex contract signals lack of trustwor-
thiness, our argument is most closely related to that of Allen and Gale.7'
Simple contracts may also signal trustworthiness because simple con-
tracts are easier to understand. When one party proposes a complex con-
tract, the other party might fear that complexity creates loopholes that
benefit the drafter. Adding language-even to protect the other against
one's own opportunism--alerts the other party to bad outcomes, suggests
one had thought of taking advantage, and makes the contract less advanta-
geous for oneself. When complexity is demanded by the environment, par-
ties may use an original simple contract as a reference point and vary its
language as little as possible.
Although proposing a simple contract may engender trust, it is no
guarantee that the proposing party has not optimized to see which among
several simple proposals is in his or her best interest. If the simple rule
proposed is an equal division, the proposer probably chose the equality to
be on the dimension most favorable to him. Trust is, in effect, the dynamic
counterpart of the fairness convention. Simplicity does not prevent venality
(or self-interest), but the latter may be easier to detect and counter with
principled argument when the original proposal was simple.72
The example of Jim the Architect (see Part I) illustrates this idea. Jim
feared that if he offered the complex contract to his customers not trained in
economics, they might think that he is trying to hornswoggle them. They
might fear that if they do not understand the contract, they will find them-
selves vulnerable to forms of opportunism that they do not anticipate. And
they might conclude that since he must have anticipated their confusion yet
nevertheless tries to force a complex contract on them, he must expect to
take advantage of them. Or they might have trouble comparing Jim's idio-
syncratic contract with the conventional contracts offered by other archi-
tects, and therefore assume that Jim must be trying to obfuscate.
The fact that simple contracts may engender or reflect trust has long
been recognized. Macauley argues that "carefully planned arrangements
may create undesirable exchange relationships .... Some businessmen
object that in such a carefully worked out relationship, one gets perform-
ance only to the letter of the contract," whereas performing to the spirit of
the contract would offer mutual expected gains.73 Holmstrom and Roberts
observe that the "contracts between Japanese auto makers and their suppli-
71 Allen & Gale, supra note 17; see also Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23
RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992); discussions in Bemheim & Whinston, supra note 53, and Schwartz, Incom.
plete Contracts, supra note 25.
72 This argument that simple rules help in detecting self-serving behavior of others is reinforced by
the results of Allison and Messick that "divisibility of a resource by six tended to make equality [of divi-
sion among six people] more salient and hence acted as a restraint against taking more than an equal
share." Scott T. Allison & David M. Messick, Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of Shared Re-
sources, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 195,210 (1990).
73 Macaulay, supra note 60, at 64.
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ers are short and remarkably imprecise, essentially committing the parties
only to work together to resolve difficulties as they emerge .... The key to
making this sstem work is obviously the long-term, repeated nature of the
interaction.' '7  Ma and McGuire 75 find a significant "reputational effect" in
their analysis of the incentives in a behavioral (i.e., mental health and sub-
stance abuse) health carve out76 instituted by the Group Insurance Commis-
sion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Gibbons and Murphy found
that total compensation of CEOs in a sample became more responsive to
their firms' stock market performance as the CEOs approached retirement. 7
This illustrates the power of reputation and career concerns in long-term
relationships to substitute for more explicit, and presumably more formulaic
and complex, contracts. 78
H. Judicial Enforcement Costs
Judicial enforcement costs also are likely to influence the complexity
of a contract. Some important events or actions, although readily observ-
able to the affected parties, may be difficult or impossible to specify in the
contract in such a way that a court can enforce obligations based on that in-
formation-i.e., some information is observable but not verifiable. These
kinds of transaction costs are closely related to writing costs, since writing
enforceable contract clauses may be more costly than writing those clauses
in the absence of verifiability concerns; but we will refer to this category of
transaction costs as "enforcement costs." Some important information sim-
ply may be unverifiable (i.e., there are infinite enforcement costs for con-
tracting on that information), even if mutually observable by the contracting
parties. For example, a seller and buyer may be able to determine that the
goods delivered by the seller are substandard, while a court might not be
74 Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries ofthe Firm Revisited, 12 J. Ec.N. PERSP. 73,
81(1998).
75 Ching-to Albert Ma & T. G. McGuire, Cost and Incentives In a Behavioral Health Carve Out, 17
HEALTH APF. 53 (1998).
76 A "carve out" is a contractual arrangement in health care under which a particular set of services
(such as mental health and substance abuse treatment) are "carved out" from the total health insurance
premium and contracted out separately to a provider distinct from that insuring and providing the rest of
the health services to a beneficiary population.
77 See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEAMET 266
(1992).
78 See also Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The E46clency of Incomplete Contracts: An
EmpiricalAnalysis ofAir Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECO,. 126 (1993) (finding that con-
tractors with better reputations are less likely to have a fixed-cost contract and more likely to have a
cost-reimbursement contract). According to Bajari and Tadelis, supra note 12, at 30, "fixed price con-
tracts feature high levels of design, high cost reducing incentives, and possibly large amounts of friction
when changes are required. Cost plus contracts feature low levels ofdesign, fast tra king [shorter com-
pletion time], low cost reduction incentives, and low friction for changes." And see Banerjee and Duflo,
supra note 16 (finding that in the Indian software industry more established firms have simpler time-
and-material contracts, while young firms have complex fixed-price contracts).
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able to distinguish substandard goods from acceptable goods, say, due to
lack of expertise or because the goods are perishable. These distinctions are
important for understanding contracts. Contracts frequently condition obli-
gations on verifiable information like market price, but rarely on economi-
cally relevant information that is difficult to verify, such as the buyer's
demand or the seller's marginal cost.79
Enforcement costs may push toward contract simplicity. When judi-
cial enforcement is expensive or unreliable, parties might prefer terms that
judges can easily understand, and that lawyers will not spend high-priced
hours trying to manipulate or interpret to one side's benefit.80 Each term
would pick out the features of each future state that distinguish it from an-
other future state. But these features might be so similar that a judge would
think that a term applies to state X when in fact it covers state Y. Antici-
pating this problem, the parties use broader terms that apply to larger slices
of the future. The result is that the contract has fewer terms and on this di-
mension is simpler.
For example, suppose that seller and buyer agree that seller should re-
place the goods if they break down after reasonable use by the buyer (state
X) but not if the buyer's use is unreasonable (state Y). The parties know
that they will be able to tell whether the buyer's use was reasonable or not,
but have no confidence that a court will be able to do so. So they agree to a
simpler contract that either contains a warranty for all states or no warranty
at all. Another example might be the tendency of employment contracts to
be either at will, in which case the employee can be terminated for virtually
any reason, or for cause (such as when academic tenure is granted), in which
case the employee can be terminated only in very unusual circumstances.
Intermediate provisions may be uncommon because parties do not believe
that the quality of the employee's work could be verified by the courts.
Unfortunately, unreliable judicial enforcement can also lead to com-
plexity. If judicial enforcement is unreliable, parties might put in more
terms in the hope of preventing a legal dispute that will lead to judicial ac-
tion, and in the hope of constraining the judge if legal action becomes nec-
essary. Parties would no longer want to rely on a simple contract with a
vague "best efforts" clause, because they could not be sure that a judge
would be able to determine the ex ante optimal terms.
For example, suppose the parties expect that if the contract contains a
warranty, a court will decline to enforce it if the buyer misuses the product,
but they fear that the court will mistakenly interpret due care as misuse, or
vice versa. Rather than using a simple contract with a warranty, the parties
add a number of terms that distinguish due care from misuse. Similarly, if
79 See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Contracts
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Relational Contracts].
80 An arbitrator says, "It's good for my business that things are becoming more complex." Gail Di-
ane Cox, Arbitration Is No Simple Matter, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1999, at Al.
HeinOnline  -- 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 120 2000-2001
Design and Interpretation of Contracts
employers and employees expect judges to misinterpret the reason for ter-
minations when a vague "just cause" term is used, they might add terms
that provide greater guidance.81
An additional effect is that when judicial enforcement is expensive or
unreliable, parties might substitute alternative institutional arrangements.
Organizational form and governance structure are endogenously chosen ac-
cording to the nature of transactions. 82 Thus, the contracts we observe may
in fact come from a truncated distribution in which the more complex con-
tracts are not observed because transactions that would require such com-
plex contracts are governed by internal organization rather than explicit
contracting. Suppose the optimal contract for a supplier and buyer extends
for many years, in order to give the supplier sufficient time to recover the
costs of an investment specific to this relationship. During that time, the
contract must deter the buyer from opportunistically switching to another
supplier. However, courts cannot distinguish opportunistic behavior from
ex ante value-maximizing behavior. Anticipating this problem, the parties
might merge, and then control behavior by fiat rather than relying on courts.
If this occurs, then we would observe that contracts more frequently govern
simpler environments, and thus contracts are more frequently simple.
Joskow has examined the relationship between electric utilities and
their coal suppliers.83 He found relatively strong empirical evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis that contracts become more complex as relationship-
specific investment becomes more important. The reason is presumably
that utilities that make large relationship-specific investments-at the ex-
treme, by locating the generating plant at the mouth of the mine-are more
vulnerable to threats to cut off supplies, and so must protect themselves by
entering into complex contingent contracts. In the extreme case of mine-
mouth plants, however, these contracts are rare because the plant and sup-
plier usually vertically integrate.8n The parties avoid the potentially large
costs of renegotiating long-term contracts or honoring the original contract
when market circumstances change, as when coal prices in the 1980s fell
81 Arbitration clauses are becoming increasingly complex because judges enforce them narrowly.
For example, after a New York court held that an arbitration clause in an employment contract that ap-
plied to "all differences ... over the application or performance of any part" of the contract did not ap-
ply to age discrimination claims, parties added age bias claims to the clause. As a result of arbitration
litigation, "[a]rbitration clauses are becoming paragraphs, and paragraphs are becoming pages." Id.
82 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Coase,
supra note 32, at 386.
1 Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Spctfic Itraments: Empirical Evldence from
Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987) [hereinafter Joskowv, Contract Duration], reprintcd In CASE
STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 104 (Scott E. Masten ed., 1996); Paul L Joskow, The Per-
fonnance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets, 21 RAND . ECON. 251 (1990);
Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Elcctric Gener-
atingPlants, I J.L ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985) [hereinafter Joskow, Vertical Integration].
84 See Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 83, at 55.
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below those anticipated in long-term contracts written in the 1970s between
utilities and coal suppliers."5
I. Bounded Rationality and Renegotiation
Bounded rationality and the costs of deliberation are fundamental rea-
sons why simple contracts prevail. Bounded rationality constrains behavior
to be "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."'8 6 Aside from transaction
costs, bounded rationality is the most commonly cited reason in the aca-
demic literature for overly simple contracts.8 7
As noted in our definition of complexity, the cognitive load required to
understand a contract is an important dimension of complexity. Frequently
this dimension will interact with the other dimensions of complexity, in that
more contingencies and greater variability of payments require greater cog-
nitive effort to assimilate. Even when the other factors that push toward
simplicity are not significant, simplicity may nevertheless prevail because
contracting parties find that fine-tuning some terms will cause other terms
to become undesirable, and it is too hard to keep all such trade-offs straight
in a cognitively limited mind. Taylor has suggested that people are cogni-
tive misers who endeavor to simplify the world through use of cognitive
shortcuts,88 which leads them to favor simple contracts. For example, equal
division may be used in many different aspects of a transaction rather than a
more efficient arrangement that varies division according to contingencies,
because it is too difficult to figure out different payoffs along different di-
mensions under many potential contingencies.
Economists have attempted to analyze formally the implications of
such constraints for contractual form. Unfortunately there is no tractable,
parsimonious model of bounded rationality. Lacking such a model, it is dif-
ficult to formalize the common way in which contracts appear overly sim-
ple, i.e., with gaps and errors. In lieu of such analysis, some economists
have resorted to modeling the effects of bounded rationality by assuming
that although the contracting parties themselves are unboundedly rational,
they are constrained by a boundedly rational third party, the courts. This
modeling strategy essentially posits large enforcement costs and the inevi-
tability of renegotiation (discussed below).89
85 See generally Joskow, Contract Duration, supra note 84.
86 HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1961) quoted in WILLIAMSON, THE ME-
CHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 82, at 6. For an overview of this concept, see John Conlisk,
Why Bounded Rationality? 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996).
87 See HART, supra note 33.
88 S.E. Taylor, The Interface of Cognitive and Social Psychology, In COGNITION, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT(J.H. Harvey ed., 1981).
89 Even though p-incompleteness stemming directly from bounded rationality of the contracting
parties has not been successfully modeled, "there is another sense in which one can say that a contract is
incomplete: it is incomplete if the parties would like to add contingent clauses, but are prevented from do-
ing so by the fact that the state of nature cannot be verified (or because states are too expensive to describe
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Such a model--"smare' contracting parties, "dumb" courts-leads
naturally to a view that courts cannot and should not attempt to complete
contracts that contracting parties themselves leave p-incomplete.90 A more
general model of bounded rationality, where participants are boundedly ra-
tional as well, might endorse a more active role of the courts. We return to
this issue of the appropriate level of judicial intervention in the final section
of this article. For the moment we focus on the important connections
among enforcement costs, bounded rationality, and renegotiation in leading
to contract simplicity.
Parties who are boundedly rational will recognize that they cannot
foresee all future contingencies, or contract cheaply on unlikely contingen-
cies that are foreseen. 9' For these two reasons, they value the freedom to
renegotiate contracts in the future as contingencies arise. They are also
likely to value legal gap-filling, if efficient and effective. Anticipating such
renegotiation or gap-filling, parties can save up-front negotiation costs by
entering into contracts that are simpler than would otherwise be optimal.
At the same time, the freedom to renegotiate has costs. The freedom to
renegotiate can be costly because what turns out to be mutually beneficial
or ex post efficient-that is, the outcome of renegotiation-is often not op-
timal from the ex ante point of view. For example, a commitment not to
negotiate with kidnappers is ex ante efficient for deterring kidnapping, but
will be effective only if the commitment is credible. Once a loved one has
been kidnapped, it becomes difficult to deny the appeal of (re)negotiating
for release. But if kidnappers anticipate this difficulty, one's commitment
not to negotiate with kidnappers is not credible, and the ex ante efficient
outcome-deterrence of kidnapping-will not be achieved. This phenome-
non can be generalized. As Milgrom and Roberts note, anticipation that
contracting parties will renegotiate "may deprive the original agreement of
its credibility and may prevent it from guiding behavior as it should." 92
One party will be reluctant to make efficient relationship-specific invest-
ments when renegotiation implies vulnerability to hold up by the other
party. A utility, for example, will not locate a plant at the mouth of a mine
if the mine is free to demand a higher price or take its business elsewhere in
the future, and the utility cannot obtain an adequate remedy from a court
because information is not verifiable.
93
ex ante).... It is true that the parties' obligations are fully specified and that renegotiation at date I always
'completes' the contract (Le., makes it contingent). However, the way the contract is completed is not
optimal from an ex ante perspective." Hart & Moore, supra note 26, at 134-35.
90 See, e-g., Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 25.
91 But only as long as their rationality is not too bounded. They must be sufficiently rational to re-
alize that they cannot anticipate and understand all events.
92 MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 77, at 127.
93 For a critique ofjudicial refusal to enforce no-renegotiation clauses, see Christine Jolls, Contracts as
Bilateral ommitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997).
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Because of these concerns, perfectly rational parties might want to en-
ter complex contracts that forbid renegotiation or specify the boundaries of
renegotiation if events change. However, if parties recognize their own
cognitive limitations, and thus realize that drafting a contract anticipating
almost all possible contingencies would require exorbitant time and mental
effort, then they are unlikely to find complexity cost-effective.
Although under special circumstances the freedom to renegotiate might
result in complexity,94 under more ordinary circumstances it will lead to
contractual simplicity. First, some contract terms can wait until later.
When parties expect to renegotiate obligations under a particular state of the
world, they do not need to supply terms that specify obligations under that
state of the world. Fewer terms mean greater simplicity. Second, if parties
acknowledge that renegotiation will be unavoidable even when one party is
in a position to hold up the other, they will have to rely on trust and other
nonlegal mechanisms. As discussed above, trust and the conventions on
which it relies tend to enhance simplicity. Third, parties need not try to es-
tablish mechanisms to commit not to renegotiate. Since there are many
ways to contract around such commitments (e.g., by side-contracting or
colluding with third parties 95), commitment mechanisms often have to be
complex, and their absence fosters simplicity.
Our argument parallels recent contributions to the literature on the
foundations of p-incomplete contracts. Hart and Moore show that in a
world in which parties are free to renegotiate their contracts, p-incomplete
contracts are often optimal.96 In effect, once parties know that the contract
will be modified in the future, they may be just as well off with a p-
incomplete contract as with a p-complete one that they may choose to ig-
nore when a future state occurs. Renegotiation potential will lead to p-
incomplete contracts when terms that would otherwise be desirable for pre-
venting opportunism have no credibility since parties can renegotiate.
Contracts will be simple for the same reason: additional terms, that would
be desirable if sure to be followed, are instead of limited, if any, value,
given that they will be obviated by renegotiation. Fewer terms will gener-
94 Consider a contract to paint a person's portrait. The painter may fear that once the portrait is
complete, the buyer can offer to pay a much lower price than originally agreed upon, knowing that few
if any others will be willing to pay for a portrait of someone else. (The law allows the buyer to refuse in
good faith, but lack of good faith is hard to prove.) To avoid having the painting effort held up in this
way, the painter may insist upon a more complicated contract that features installment payments as the
portrait progresses. Alternatively, suppose a portrait of a leader will be needed, but it is unclear at the
time of contracting who the leader will be (e.g., because elections may be called to select a new leader).
In this case the contract may be simple, with both parties agreeing to wait until the future is revealed to
specify the portrait rather than write a complex contingent contract anticipating and describing the many
possible future scenarios.
95 See Hart & Moore, supra note 26, at 128-29.
96 id.
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ally imply fewer contingencies, less payoff variability, and easier cognitive
understanding, i.e., simplicity along multiple dimensions. 97
As it turns out, even when parties believe that they would be better off
under a contract that prohibits renegotiation, the law does not permit such
contracts.98 Two merchants, for example, cannot enter an enforceable con-
tract that bars them from changing the contract if both desire to do so.
Scholars in the economics of contracts literature have suggested that the
reason parties support a legal system that does not enforce a mutual promise
not to renegotiate is that parties recognize their own bounded rationality.'
One might think that sophisticated contractors sufficiently self-aware about
their tendency toward ex post opportunism to lobby for laws that restrict
their own ability to (re)contract are also sufficiently self-aware of their
bounded rationality to refrain from entering no-renegotiation contracts. If
they suffer from lack of self-discipline, they can order their lawyers to pre-
vent them from entering contracts that prohibit modifications. But if courts
allow or force modification of initial terms when it is beneficial to one party
(e.g., because asymmetric information suggests that party was taken advan-
tage of), then it would seem to be even more incumbent upon the courts to
allow modification when both parties find it mutually beneficial. For exam-
ple, the parties could (secretly) agree to make it appear to the court that one
party was taken advantage of when agreeing to the no-renegotiation contract,
therefore making modification of the contract desirable. If renegotiation is
generally allowed, therefore, it is almost impossible for some parties to opt
for a contractual regime that guarantees that modifications will be prohibited.
J. Sumniary
This Part has discussed many reasons why contracts are more complex
than standard economic models predict. All of these reasons are susceptible
to empirical testing. For example, one can test the influence of trust on the
complexity of contracts by comparing the contracts in communities in
which the level of trust is high, and the contracts in communities in which
the level of trust is low, holding the economic relationship (and as much
else as possible) constant'00 One can test the influence of environmental
complexity, such as the duration of the relationship, by comparing con-
97 For a critique of the Hart and Moore view., see Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contin-
gencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999) (arguing that people would prefer a
world in which they could enter renegotiation-proof contracts).
98 See Jolls, supra note 93, at 208-09 (and citations therein).
99 See ILYA SEGAL, COMPLEXITY AND RENEGOTIATION: A FOUNDATION FOR INCO.MPLETE
CONTRACTS (1996); Hart & Moore, supra note 26.
100 For example, one could compare the very simple contracts governing diamond sales in the ethni-
cally homogenous communities described in Lisa Bemstein, Opting Out of the Legal Sstem: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992), with those used in other
areas of the country or in other countries where sales occur among people who are not members of such
a homogenous community.
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tracts, like real property leases, that are similar in many respects but have
varying duration.10 Some empirical work has already been done, and we
have discussed some of it briefly; but more such work needs to be focused
on the particular issue of the relationship between complexity and the vari-
ous factors we have identified. This empirical work would be difficult but
worthwhile, and we leave it for future research. For now, we turn to the
normative implications of our positive analysis of contractual complexity.
IV. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE ROLE OF COURTS
One normative implication of our analysis is directed to lawyers, and
this is simply that more detail is not always good. Lawyers tend to make
contracts as detailed as possible because they want to resolve every possible
future contingency in advance. But detail makes for complexity, and com-
plexity can sow distrust, overwhelm the cognitive capacities of the parties,
absorb resources, and have many other negative consequences. Complex
contracts may be unnecessary when courts are sophisticated and futile when
they are dull. Further research should focus on how lawyers ought to
evaluate complexity when drafting contracts.10 2
The main normative implication of our analysis is directed to courts
and legislatures. We argue that although the simplicity of a contract is not
intrinsically valuable, and there is no reason to think that courts and legis-
latures should encourage contracts to be simple or complex, the simplicity
or complexity of a contract does have instrumental value. The degree of
complexity of a contract is a clue about the circumstances under which it
101 Using the contracts database available at <http//crcse.business.pitt.edu/>, we conducted very
preliminary empirical work to establish some stylized facts and test the plausibility of some of our hy-
potheses about the relationships among economic stake in the contract, duration, and complexity. We
had 2 samples, each with 32 contracts. One sample involved land contracts; the other involved leases.
In our sample of land contracts, we found that the number of lines in the contract-a crude proxy for
complexity-was positively associated with the contract price (p < 0.05). In our sample of leases, con-
tract duration (in years) was far more powerful than price in explaining the number of lines in the con-
tract. This is not surprising, since as a lease stretches over many years, uncertainty-the driver of
complexity-plays an increasingly important role. Considerations such as general escalation in rents, re-
quired repairs to the building, and the economic success of the lessor, all uncertain ex ante, will affect the
contract. The positive correlation between contract length and price became statistically insignificant when
controlling for contract duration. Price per year, years, and years-squared could jointly explain about one-
third of the variation in "complexity" (proxied by lines) for the sample. There was also some evidence of
diminishing returns to complexity as duration increased. (The estimated coefficient for years-squared was
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, controlling for price per year and years.) Unfortunately
these empirical results are no more than suggestive: the proxy for complexity is crude; the samples are
small; many potentially relevant independent variables were not available, etc. For example, we know
nothing of the contracting environment for each contract. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings, along
with other studies cited herein, indicate that the factors we discuss are of some empirical relevance. Much
more work remains to be done in quantifying and explaining the simplicity and complexity of contracts.
102 The tension between lawyers and business people is part of the folklore. Lawyers complain that
business people do not plan carefully enough against future contingencies; business people complain
that lawyers' caution interferes with valuable deals. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 60.
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was negotiated and the characteristics of the parties. Courts should use this
clue, as they use other clues such as the f-completeness of the contract, the
formality of the bargaining procedure, and so on, in order to determine the
best approach for interpreting and enforcing the contract
To clarify this idea, we start by adopting Schwartz's distinction be-
tween "strict" (or "passive" or "literal" or "formalistic") interpretation of
contracts and "liberal" (or "active" or "aggressive") interpretation.10 3  A
court engages in strict interpretation when it follows the rules of contract
law in a relatively mechanical way; promises are enforced only when they
are clearly included in the instrument and the contract clearly complies with
the formal requirements of contract formation (offer, acceptance, writing,
and so on). A court engages in liberal interpretation when it relies heavily
on its judgment. Typically, a liberal court will be concerned about deter-
mining the parties' general contractual goals, and will freely "imply" (that
is, insert) terms or shade stated obligations in a way that makes the outcome
broadly desirable. If the liberal court wishes to maximize the value of con-
tracting, it will interpret the contract in a way that (roughly speaking)
maximizes the ex ante joint surplus of the contract.'
14
We make two assumptions. First, we assume that the proper normative
goal is to maximize the ex ante value of contractual relationships. Second,
because events may be observable to the parties but not verifiable before a
court, and courts may suffer from hindsight bias and other cognitive defects,
we assume for purposes of discussion that: (1) the asymmetry of information
and bounded rationality that hamper courts ex post is not too severe (in
ways described below); and (2) courts can limit their consideration to what
well-informed parties would have agreed to rather than rely on externally
derived notions of what is fair or desirable.' u6 In general, effective aggres-
sive contract interpretation will require a more competent court system than
that required for literal enforcement. 0 6 We acknowledge that the proposals
below assume highly sophisticated courts, and may have to be adjusted in or-
der to be sensible for real courts. We will focus on arguments for and against
liberal interpretation by competent courts; lack of such competence would
103 Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 79, at 282-83.
"o4 Liberal interpretation is associated with Llewellyn, Corbin, and Traynor. See Pacific Gas & Elc.
Co. v. GMW. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (1968) (Traynor, J.) (criticizing formalistic
contractual interpretation); Arthur L Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Laiv of Contracts, 48 YALE L.
426 (1939) (praising Cardozo for seeing through form and enforcing the parties' intentions).
1o5 If courts are limited in their self-control, or hindered in their decision making, aggressive inter-
pretation can have grave negative consequences, both on the contracts that are interpreted, and through a
feedback effect on the contracts that are negotiated initially. Liberal interpretation is generally less pre-
dictable than literal enforcement, encouraging attempts to renegotiate for a greater share of a surplus (or
a smaller share of a loss), and rewarding socially unproductive investment in ability to predict court be-
havior. If these constraints are serious, literal enforcement of a contract's verifiable terms would be
preferable to aggressive interpretation.
106 See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L REV. 533, 540-47 (1998).
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reinforce the arguments against aggressive gap-filling but would not obviate
the need for the often difficult determination of what type of contract was
efficient ex ante and how the court should best respond ex post.
TABLE 5: APPROPRIATE COURT REACTIONS TO VARIOUS CAUSES OF
CONTRACTUAL SIMPLICITY
CAUSE OF SIMPLICITY ] APPROPRIATE REACTION EXAMPLE
Environmental Enforce strictly (the contract is One-shot sales contract
Simplicity simple because the optimal terms (as opposed to require-
happen to be simple) ments contract)
High negotiation Enforce liberally (the contract is Contract between people
costs simple because the parties cannot who speak different ian-
include the complex optimal guages
terms)
Asymmetric infor- Enforce liberally (for example, Insurance, or contracts
mation (so terms are imply a warranty) across industries
omitted by the in-
formed party for
strategic reasons)
Monitoring dynamics Enforce strictly Construction of addition
(e.g., multitasking) to house
Forms (especially in Enforce strictly (simplicity is the Real estate contract
large industry with result of evolutionary process); or
symmetric informa- liberally (if courts can improve on
tion) or hasten evolution)
Conventions Enforce liberally (that is, treat Contract between mem-
conventions as implied terns) bers of a trade association
Trust and reputation Enforce strictly vis-A-vis trust re- Contract between mem-
lations, but liberally vis-A-vis bers of a trade associa-
high-value opportunism tion
High court enforce- Enforce strictly (because liberal Contract to buy Interet
ment costs (so parties enforcement is costly and leads to startup business (where
rely on renegotiation error) main value of business is




For less sophisticated, boundedly
rational parties, enforce liberally
and allow renegotiation; for so-
phisticated, unboundedly rational
parties, enforce strictly and allow
commitment not to renegotiate
Consumer sales contract
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Suppose a legal dispute revolves around interpretation of a simple
contract. What should the court do? Table 5 above summarizes normative
arguments that emerge from the analysis above. They are intended to be
suggestive, not conclusive, and we hope to develop them in future work.
The examples are also meant to be suggestive, and not to represent the only
application of the argument.
The table should be interpreted with care. As noted above, the "rec-
ommendations" are meant to be highly preliminary and suggestive. It
would take many pages to defend them adequately, and to specify the con-
ditions under which they hold.10 7 At this point, our goal is to show ways in
which the positive analysis might shed light on normative concems, not to
establish that courts should, as a general matter, adopt liberal or strict ap-
proaches to interpretation.08 In particular, our goal is to show that the de-
gree of simplicity of a contract sheds light on factors that courts care about
when they resolve contract disputes.
An example will illustrate. Suppose that a seller and buyer have a dis-
pute about a simple contract for the sale of goods. The contract contains
only price and quantity terms, with no variation in the payment and no dif-
ficult formulas. According to Table 5, there may be at least nine reasons
why the contract is simple. The parties might have a trust relationship, the
conventions in the industry might be robust, negotiation costs might be
high, and so on. Evidence will shed light on these conditions; it might es-
tablish, for example, that the parties have dealt vith each other for many
years and indeed have a relationship of trust. After it has examined the evi-
dence, the court might still be unsure about only one or two of the relevant
factors. At this point, the simplicity of the contract provides a clue about the
background of the contract. The court might conclude, for example, that the
simplicity of the contract must be due-all other reasons having been elimi-
nated by the evidence-to asymmetric information. If the third row of the ta-
ble is correct, then the court should enforce liberally. Or the court might
conclude that only the simplicity of the environment can account for the
simplicity of the contract. If so, then it should enforce the contract strictly.
The example assumes that in order to interpret a contract properly, a so-
phisticated court needs to know about negotiation costs, asymmetric infor-
mation, and the other factors in the left column of the table, but rarely can
these factors be established directly by evidence. The example shows that the
107 For example, many will quarrel with our treatment of conventions. There are many complica-
tions; at least, (1) the conventions should arise under conditions where they are likely to be cfficient, see
Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Lmv Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law,
14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 215 (1994); (2) the conventions must be verifiable by courts rather than op-
timal only given nonlegal enforcement by private adjudicators, see Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Cw. L REv. 133, 158
(1996); and (3) they must be coherent and meaningful (for skepticism, see Bernstein, supra note 60, at 710).
108 The specific recommendations are based on the positive analysis, including prior literature cited
in the earlier discussions.
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simplicity or complexity of the contract also sheds light on which factors
played an important role in the creation of the contract. This claim is similar
to, though subtler than, the view that if a contract is highly f-incomplete and
overlooks obvious contingencies, or if a contract is scrawled on the back of a
napkin, a court can infer something about the circumstances under which it
was negotiated (for example, that the parties are unsophisticated or were in
a hurry). But complexity is a more difficult concept, for as we have shown,
even very sophisticated parties might prefer simple contracts.
We do not claim that the simplicity of a contract is a master key that
unlocks all the mysteries of contract interpretation. Because the simplicity
of a contract is always a matter of degree, and always a function of an often
murky contractual environment, courts may often have difficulty determin-
ing whether a contract is simple or complex. Moreover, the relationship
between some of the factors (for example, judicial enforcement costs) and
the simplicity of a contract is ambiguous. Nevertheless, courts should un-
derstand that the simplicity or complexity of a contract reveals information
about the contract's source, purpose, and value.
Let us put our conclusion in context. The traditional view within law
and economics is that a court should fill a gap in a contract if transaction
costs are high, construe the contract strictly if transactions costs are low,
and, when it must fill a gap, either supply a term that the parties would have
wanted or one that would give parties the proper incentives to reveal infor-
mation ex ante. 1°9 Consider, as an example, a well-known case involving
the question whether the word "chicken," which was used in a sales con-
tract, should be interpreted strictly to include all chickens or liberally to in-
clude only broilers. 1  The traditional view held that if the cost of
negotiation was high and the amount at stake was low, the court should be
more inclined to interpret the term liberally, in which case it should fill the
gap with a majoritarian default (putting aside the question of information
incentives). A majoritarian default is the term that the parties to the con-
tract under dispute, or most parties who buy and sell chickens, would prefer
(ex ante). If that term would be a definition of chicken that included only
broilers, then the court should adopt such a definition.
Our analysis unpacks this traditional approach, and shows that (1) how
the court should interpret a word, such as "chicken," depends on which cir-
cumstances are responsible for the contract's gap (that is, the absence of a
definition of chicken), and (2) the degree of complexity of the contract may
reveal whether the failure to include a more precise term reflects one cir-
cumstance rather than another. The court should begin with the observation
that the chicken contract was simple, which indicates that one or more of
the nine factors listed in Table 5 was at work. Evidence can then be used to
109 See, eg., Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 43, at 586-88.
110 See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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winnow down the possibilities. If the court concludes that the simplicity of
the chicken contract resulted from asymmetric information rather than moni-
toring dynamics, or reliance on convention rather than reliance on trust-based
nonlegal sanctions, it should enforce liberally. By contrast, if the contract
were complex, the court might conclude that the writing reflects the best ef-
forts of sophisticated parties to provide for all imaginable contingencies given
enforcement costs, and enforce strictly. It is in this sense that the simplicity
of a contract provides a clue about the contract's background, a clue that may
be valuable for determining the appropriate mode of interpretation.
Now contrast our view with Schwartz's, which is that when a simple
contract arises from a complex (actually, long-term) environment, the court
should enforce the contract literally."' We claim that the complexity of the
environment may be a reason for liberal interpretation, because when the
environment is complex, a simple contract may be inefficient. There may
be a valuable role for moderately aggressive courts in terms of filling in
gaps in contracts under certain circumstances, rather than merely enforcing
a contract's verifiable terms literally. This conclusion, to be sure, depends
on our assumption that courts are reasonably competent, and can sort out
the competing accounts offered by parties about why a contract takes the
form that it did. If this assumption is incorrect, courts should adopt the
more passive stance advocated by Schwartz. But it is not clear whether this
assumption is correct or incorrect.!12
Finally, our analysis implies that sophisticated parties should be able to
opt into one of the two alternative regimes of court interpretation, strict or
liberal. If parties think their contract (whether simple or complex) would be
best interpreted by a strict court, then they can opt for a strict court by
placing an appropriate term in the contract; alternatively, they can opt for a
liberal court. Although there are already doctrinal tools available for this
task," there would be an incremental improvement if courts systematically
III Schwartz offers this argument in the spirit of conjecture; in addition, he excludes from his analy-
sis many of the factors on which we focus. See Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 25;
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 79. For other views of this subject, sec Charles Goetz &
Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L REV. 1089 (1931); Robert E. Scott, A Rela-
tional Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
112 Schwartz's view itself depends on courts having a minimum level ofcompetence. If they are too
incompetent, then no information is verifiable, in which case discussion of the optimal judicial strategy
is idle. See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Lav Under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000). For other discussions of contract law and judicial competence,
see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38-41 (1993); Gillian Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation ofln-
complete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
113 Parties that fear liberal interpretation can (1) include a merger clause, which directs courts not to
rely on evidence of precontractual negotiations when interpreting contracts; (2) include a clause asking
the court to ignore extra-contractual evidence such as course of dealing; (3) avoid clauses that invite ju-
dicial scrutiny of the contractual relationship, such as "best eforts" and "good faith" clauses; and (4)
include a choice of law term that directs the adjudicating court to apply the law of a state that has strict
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recognized choices about modes of interpretation-strict or liberal-made
in contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
Contracts are frequently simpler than the economic theory of optimal
contracting suggests is desirable. We have discussed many reasons why
simple contracts prevail: simple environments, negotiation costs, asymmet-
ric information, monitoring dynamics, evolutionary pressures, conventions,
reliance on trust and reputation, judicial enforcement costs, and bounded
rationality and renegotiation. These conclusions can be refined in future
work through empirical testing. The conclusions also have normative im-
plications. They highlight the costs of complexity, and suggest that when
lawyers draft contracts, they should sometimes sacrifice detail for the sake
of simplicity. And the conclusions suggest ways in which courts should
pay attention to the complexity of contracts when interpreting them. The
complexity of a contract may provide clues about the conditions under
which it was negotiated, and courts typically want, and should want, to un-
derstand these conditions when deciding whether to enforce a contract.
interpretive rules. Indeed, parties routinely follow the first two strategies, and we suspect that they fol-
low the third and fourth as well. However, there is a danger that liberal courts will interpret any of these
clauses liberally, which will tend to muddy the outcome.
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